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Abstract  
 
Sub-state governments have emerged as important sites of climate policy innovation, but their capacity 
for action has rarely been examined. Although they are devolved regions within the same state, 
Scotland and Wales have varying degrees of constitutional competence. We conduct an inter- and intra-
regional comparison to examine whether constitutional competence shapes the scale of ambition and 
achievement in climate policy outputs and outcomes. Focusing on emission reduction programmes and 
renewable energy, while there is a clear relationship between constitutional capacity and policy 
ambition, it is more evident in the capacity to deliver than in policy ambition. Other factors, such as 
civil society strength and the politics of territorial distinctiveness, also matter in shaping ambition, in 
spite of limitations in decision-making autonomy. 
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Introduction 
 
While nation-states have struggled in recent years to work collectively and sometimes individually to 
pursue ambitious climate change mitigation, sub-state nations, regions and cities have emerged as 
important sites of climate policy innovation. Networks such as the Climate Group’s State’s and 
Regions Alliance, the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development and C40 Cities 
promote ambitious climate action in regions and metropolitan cities. Sub-state governments are 
increasingly positioned as critical to achieving climate change commitments; the UNDP estimates that 
50-80% of actions required to implement a global climate change agreement relate to sub-state 
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competences. Not all sub-state polities are ambitious in this policy sphere. Leaders and laggards are as 
evident at the sub-state level as among nation-states. National and sub-state authorities vary in the 
extent to which they demonstrate political will, or face political pressure, to promote low carbon 
innovation, and are incentivized or constrained in their policy choices by their perception of the 
economic gains and losses that such action entails (Scruggs 2003, Jänicke 2005, Sippel and Jenssen 
2010). In contrast to nation-states, however, sub-state authorities have less capacity for action. Jänicke 
(2005, pp. 132-3) has asserted that nation-states are uniquely placed to pursue ambitious environmental 
policies because of their relatively high policy capacity with respect to financial resources, personnel, 
professional competence and coercive power. Regions, as a rule, have fewer capacities, at least within 
their national settings; a powerful region such as California may have more capacity than a smaller 
European nation-state and certainly more than nation-states within the developing world, but it still has 
fewer material and institutional resources at its disposal than the US federal government. Yet, there is 
significant variation in the capacities of sub-state regional authorities, which may in part explain 
variation in the extent to which they are empowered to act in the climate arena.  
 
Here, we focus on the extent to which variations in capacity can explain variations in policy outputs 
and outcomes in Scotland and Wales. We focus on constitutional capacity, derived from the 
constitutional distribution of legislative and executive powers to the sub-state level. Constitutional 
asymmetry within the UK allows us to examine the impact of our key variable while holding the 
nation-state context constant. We can also control for the effect of economic development, considered a 
key driver of environmental ambition (Börzel 2002); Scotland is more prosperous than Wales on most 
measures, but not dramatically so when prosperity levels are considered in a broader comparative 
context. Successive Scottish and Welsh governments have also operated in the context of similar 
ideological and territorial political environments, and have espoused similar rhetorical commitments to 
being at the forefront of climate action. However, there remain marked variations in their constitutional 
autonomy and their institutional resources. The Scottish Parliament was founded in 1999 with primary 
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legislative powers in a wide range of policies associated with climate action, though there are some 
crucial areas of policy – notably, energy regulation, taxation and EU/international representation – 
which to date remain the preserve of the Westminster parliament and government. The National 
Assembly for Wales initially lacked primary legislative power in any field. Although its powers have 
gradually increased in the intervening years, especially since 2011, they remain more circumscribed 
than those of its Scottish counterpart. 
 
We examine the central hypothesis that constitutional capacity relates positively to climate ambition. 
We do so by sub-dividing this hypothesis to examine the effect of constitutional capacity within and 
between the cases. First, we expect that climate ambition, with respect to both policy outputs and policy 
outcomes, will be higher in Scotland than in Wales, given the former’s greater constitutional capacity. 
Second, we hypothesize that within each case, climate outputs and outcomes will be more ambitious in 
those policy spheres where the region in question has stronger constitutional autonomy than in spheres 
where autonomy is lacking. Our analysis suggests that, while constitutional capacity has some 
explanatory power for climate ambition, especially in relation to the capacity to realize policy goals, 
ambition is supported and motivated by other factors too, including the strength of civil society and 
territorial distinctiveness. 
 
Capacity for Climate Action  
Despite the growing recognition and attention to sub-state climate action, capacity for action has been 
under-investigated. Some studies have observed the underlying economic motivations behind sub-state 
climate policy innovations, including a desire to exploit expanding markets and assume market 
advantage in new technologies and fields (Engel and Orbach 2008, Rabe 2008, Engel 2009, Bulkeley 
2011). Some regions are motivated by awareness of the urgency and the effects of climate change 
(Byrne et al. 2007). Political motivations, derived in particular from the multi-level context in which 
sub-state authorities must operate, include gaining ‘first mover advantage’ over other regions, just as 
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some EU member-states were able to do in a European context, thus shaping the emerging EU role in 
the climate arena to suit their preferences and goals (Héritier 1994, Liefferink and Andersen 1998). 
Sub-state governments may also be motivated by the desire to play a leadership role nationally and 
internationally, engaging in ‘paradiplomacy’ in spite of their lack of constitutional authority for 
external affairs in forums such as the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development 
(nrg4sd) (Happaerts et al. 2010). Inaction at national or federal level can generate the political 
opportunity to act, providing space for policy innovation within and across lower levels of government. 
This has been a particularly powerful explanation for innovation among US states, especially in the 
George W Bush era, with some states introducing ambitious emissions reduction programmes, 
collaborative cap-and-trade schemes and ‘renewable portfolio standards’ to facilitate and incentivize 
the transition away from fossil fuels (Rabe 2007, Engel 2009). Existing accounts also recognize the 
extent to which bureaucratic resources and strong policy networks can strengthen the capacity for sub-
state governments to act on climate change (Byrne et al. 2007, pp. 4566-67, McEwen and Bomberg 
2014). 
 
The degree of constitutional capacity enjoyed by a sub-state regional authority is rarely discussed in the 
literature. This may be because most studies take place within national contexts where constitutional 
power is commonly symmetrically distributed. Yet, the constitutional division and allocation of powers 
represents a clear source of decision-making autonomy. Multi-level systems vary in the balance of 
power between the central or federal level and the regions, depending on whether the latter’s powers 
are constitutionally entrenched, and the scope for regional authorities to make policy decisions without 
the intervention of the central/federal level. In the classic federalism literature, a distinction is made 
between federal or confederal systems and regionalized or devolved systems. In the former, sovereignty 
is divided between layers of government, and policy autonomy is entrenched in the constitution. In the 
latter, powers are devolved from the centre, and the centre remains the dominant player with the legal 
authority to withdraw regional policy competences (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Bolleyer, et al. 
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2014). Within these broad categories, however, the degree to which regional institutions can make 
decisions varies substantially, depending on the policy field under its jurisdiction and its constitutional 
and economic capacity to tax and spend (Hooghe, et al. 2008). The greater the constitutional and fiscal 
power of regional governments, the greater should be their capacity to engage in autonomous policy-
making in fields under their jurisdiction.  
 
As a relatively new policy field, ‘climate change’ is not easily demarcated constitutionally. Even in the 
UK, where constitutional power was devolved to Scotland and Wales at the end of the 1990s, there was 
no consideration of climate change as a specific area of policy responsibility when determining the 
respective powers of Westminster and the devolved institutions. Across all multi-level states, the policy 
fields implicated span the constitutional jurisdictions of central and regional government, with 
important supranational and local responsibilities too. As a result, sub-state regional authorities will 
have constitutional capacity to act in some areas of climate policy but not in others, potentially 
affecting the extent to which they can demonstrate climate ambition.  
 
The degree of constitutional capacity enjoyed by sub-state governments in the climate sphere varies 
significantly across cases. Some sub-state governments, like the Canadian provinces and Australian 
states, have jurisdiction over energy policy, and thus capacity to shape energy markets, while in most 
European nation-states, energy policy is mainly the preserve of national government. Those regions 
with jurisdiction over energy policy may have more capacity to be ambitious – or obstructive –than 
those who lack such policy competence. In some multi-level states, the primary responsibility of the 
sub-state level is to implement decisions taken at higher levels, limiting the scope for sub-state 
innovation. Sub-state governments with high levels of ‘shared power’, as in Belgium and Germany, can 
shape, or obstruct, national decision-making. Jörgensen (2012) suggested the degree of self-rule - the 
capacity to make decisions autonomously - is central in determining the potential for climate 
experimentation, while Happaerts (2012a), reviewing the Belgian case, argued that a high level of 
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constitutional capacity will not by itself be a sufficient driver if other political and economic 
motivations are lacking. But the lack of constitutional capacity can be expected to represent a barrier to 
action. Where sub-state governments lack the constitutional power to act, they may be obliged to 
comply with national decisions or frameworks, or voluntarily converge with such frameworks.  
 
Whilst we focus here on assessing the effect of the presence or absence of constitutional power, our 
analysis is informed by recognition that capacity for action is aided and constrained by other factors 
too. Across a variety of policy spheres, scholars of multi-level governance have observed that sub-state 
governments can overcome limitations of their formal constitutional power, for example, by nurturing 
and accessing policy networks and expertise to strengthen their policy development and claim a stake 
in a policy sphere, or rely upon their economic and other resource strengths to claim expertise and 
special status, or, by utilizing the skills and entrepreneurialism of talented political leaders, exert 
influence in a policy field which surpasses their constitutional autonomy (e.g. Rhodes 2007, Piattoni 
2010, Bolleyer et al. 2014). In the climate policy sphere, natural resources can compensate for lack of 
constitutional powers, especially in relation to energy policy, and provide the economic motivation for 
low carbon policy innovation.  
 
The capacity for climate action may also be influenced by a variety of less tangible political factors, 
including ideology, political strength and territorial distinctiveness (Rhodes 2007, McEwen and 
Bomberg 2014). The latter is particularly relevant to nations and regions within multinational states. 
Drawing upon and emphasizing territorial distinctiveness can provide a tool to governments seeking to 
enhance their own democratic legitimacy and to challenge the legitimacy of central government to act 
on behalf of the territorial community in question. These claims to territorial distinctiveness often go 
hand-in-hand with demands for greater political autonomy, encouraging governments in sub-state 
nations and regions to engage in policy making, across different policy spheres, which is at or even 
beyond the boundaries of their constitutional powers (Agranoff 2004, Keating and McEwen 2005). 
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Several authors examining sub-state climate action have observed the influence of territorial 
assertiveness and nation-building aspirations in the active and visible role played by ‘national’ regions 
such as Québec, Flanders, Catalonia, the Basque country, Scotland and Wales in domestic 
intergovernmental relations and within international networks for sustainable development and climate 
change mitigation. These forums help them to nurture an image as defending and advancing national 
interests, and provide an opportunity to develop a profile on the world stage as well as enhance their 
status with a home audience (Galarraga 2011, Happaerts 2012b, Happaerts et al. 2012, McEwen and 
Bomberg 2014).    
 
Methodology and Case Selection 
We explore the over-arching hypothesis, derived from the discussion above, that constitutional capacity 
shapes the level of climate ambition. We sub-divide this hypothesis in two. We posit that regions with 
greater constitutional power will be more ambitious in their climate policy action than regions that lack 
constitutional power. The former have a more extensive range of policy instruments at their disposal to 
realise their ambitions, can enact legislation to effect change in the behavior of citizens, businesses and 
public authorities, and may be in a position to incentivize the low carbon transition through regulation, 
legislation, revenue-raising and targeting resources towards distinctive climate goals. The multi-level 
nature of climate policy means that, in all cases, a sub-state government will have the constitutional 
autonomy to act in some climate spheres but not in others. We also hypothesize that sub-state 
governments will demonstrate more policy ambition in policy areas where they have stronger or clearer 
constitutional powers than in those where power primarily lies within the jurisdiction of the central 
government and parliament.  
 
The level of climate ambition is assessed in two dependent variables derived from these hypotheses: 
policy outputs and policy outcomes. Policy outputs are the programmes, targets, and legislation that 
define the scale of ambition being pursued. We focus on two types of policy outputs: GHG emissions 
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reduction programmes, and commitments to renewable energy, both of which are central to climate 
policy and indicative of the level of climate ambition. Policy outcomes are the results of policy 
initiatives in these fields, including the extent to which targets are met and change is effected. In the 
arena of climate change mitigation, programmes and targets are often long-term and so, whilst progress 
cannot be fully gauged at this stage, there is enough evidence to assess whether interim objectives are 
being met and governments are on track to achieving their long-term goals. Our key independent 
variable is constitutional power, which is assessed by the legal competences attributed to sub-state 
regional parliaments and governments.  
 
The relationship between these variables is examined in a comparative analysis of Scotland and Wales, 
using a most similar systems design. The similarity between the cases allows us to control for 
extraneous variance by holding a range of other potentially influential variables constant. As devolved 
regions of the same state, Scotland and Wales operate within the same national policy framework, and 
are similarly affected and constrained by the requirements of the EU Energy and Climate Change 
package and environmental law. As regions within a devolved state, they lack the entrenched 
sovereignty characteristic of regions within federal states. Both Scotland and Wales are economically 
advanced democracies, albeit that Scotland performs somewhat better than Wales on most economic 
indicators.1 They share similar political cultures: both can be characterized as centre-left, with a 
parliamentary representation at UK level that (until 2015) was dominated by the Labour Party, and both 
have a clear territorial dimension to party competition. Where they differ is in the level of territorial 
distinctiveness and party strength, as illustrated by the relative success of their respective nationalist 
parties, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru. From 1992 to 2010, the SNP consistently 
gained around 20% of the Scottish vote in UK general elections, while Plaid Cymru polled around 10% 
in UK elections. Their relative strength has been made even more stark by their respective 
performances in the 2015 UK election (50% for the SNP and 12% for Plaid). Within the devolved 
assemblies, the SNP has been the largest party since 2007, and the sole party of government (as a 
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minority government from 2007-2011 and with a majority thereafter). Plaid Cymru’s only experience 
of government was as a junior coalition partner to the Labour Party from 2007-11, which was, followed 
by a drop in electoral support that reduced them to third-largest party in the National Assembly for 
Wales (having previously been the second strongest party since the Assembly’s formation in 1999).  
 
In contrast to most multi-level states, the UK is characterized by constitutional asymmetry. 
Notwithstanding the significant changes to strengthen the autonomy of the National Assembly for 
Wales since 1999, the Scottish Parliament continues to enjoy greater constitutional autonomy, 
including in the portfolios most implicated in climate policy. The Scottish Parliament can legislate in 
all fields except those explicitly listed as ‘reserved matters’ in the Scotland Act, and so has autonomy 
to act on environment, waste management, land use, most areas of transport, housing, planning 
regulations, and the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Welsh devolution operates 
on a conferred powers model, specifying, and thus constraining, the areas of Welsh autonomy. Initially, 
the UK parliament retained all primary legislative powers with secondary legislative powers devolved 
in eighteen pre-defined areas. Since 2011, the National Assembly has had primary legislative powers in 
twenty areas, including climate-related areas such as environment, housing and economic development, 
but Wales does not yet constitute a distinctive legal jurisdiction. The key enabling power in the climate 
arena has been the statutory sustainable development duty, which legally obliges Welsh Ministers to 
promote sustainable development across government functions.  
 
Significant constitutional constraints have faced both Scotland and Wales in relation to energy policy. 
Responsibility for the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of energy remained a matter for 
the Westminster government and parliament in both devolution settlements. The UK government has 
therefore set the policy framework for energy, and the UK regulator, Ofgem, oversees the energy 
market. However, Scottish autonomy has been enhanced by powers that were executively devolved. 
These include the power, derived from the 1989 Electricity (Scotland) Act, to grant or withhold 
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planning consent for the construction of overhead transmission lines and new generating stations, in 
excess of 50 megawatts (MW) for onshore wind farms, coal, gas fired or nuclear power stations and in 
excess of 1 MW for offshore wind farms and (prior to 20112) hydro-electric power stations. The 
Scottish Government also operated its own Renewables Obligation, the principal mechanism for 
promoting industry investment in renewable energy throughout the UK, though this power has been 
eroded by Electricity Market Reform which replaces the RO with a system of ‘contracts for difference’ 
on a Great Britain-wide basis. Welsh energy consenting powers have been much more limited than 
those in Scotland. The Welsh Government3 has been unable to consent to large-scale energy generation 
as its executive powers remain confined to consenting to schemes under 50MW onshore and 1 MW 
offshore, and it had no capacity to design a Welsh Renewables Obligation. The executive powers of the 
Welsh Government relating to electricity planning consents remain equivalent to those afforded to local 
planning authorities in Scotland.  
 
Table 1: Hypothesized capacity to be ambitious in climate policy 
 Emissions 
reductions 
Energy 
Scotland + - 
Wales - -- 
+/- signs symbolise expected levels of ambition 
 
Table 1 depicts the hypothesized effect of these variations within and across our cases. If greater self-
rule coincides with more ambitious climate action, as we hypothesize, we would expect Scotland to 
have higher climate ambitions, expressed in climate policy outputs, than Wales, and we could also 
expect that capacity differences in self-rule would place Scotland in a more advantageous position to 
have made most progress in achieving policy outcomes. Further, within each case study, we would 
 11 
expect the devolved governments to have higher ambition and to have made most progress in emissions 
reductions, where their constitutional competence has been less constrained than in the energy field.   
 
These expectations are examined in the empirical sections below. The evidence is based on analysis of 
a wide range of documentary sources, including central and sub-state government reports, reports of the 
UK Committee on Climate Change and the Climate Change Commission for Wales, backed up by 49 
semi-structured elite interviews with officials, serving and retired government ministers, and 
representatives from the broader policy community. The purpose of interviews was to enhance our 
knowledge of policy developments, to gain insight into the scope for autonomous decision-making and 
the opportunities and constraints imposed by constitutional and non-constitutional variables, and the 
barriers to progress, rather than for the purposes of any discourse analysis.  
 
Climate Policy Output in Scotland and Wales 
Climate action in Scotland and Wales has developed alongside UK action. In contrast to their US 
counterparts, the UK’s devolved governments have not been kick-started into action by the inability or 
unwillingness of the national government to act. The key framework for emissions reductions is set at 
the EU level, with member states allocated national reductions targets. The UK Climate Change Act 
2008 - the world’s first national mandatory climate change mitigation legislation - was embedded 
within this European context, but not restricted by it. The devolved administrations were signatories to 
an agreement accompanying the UK Act, and the UK and Scottish governments, in particular, have 
been partners in pushing for more ambitious emissions reduction policies within the EU and 
internationally (McEwen and Bomberg 2014, interviews). Yet, both Scotland and Wales nonetheless 
carved out distinctive and ambitious platforms of their own.  
 
Climate Ambition in Scotland 
The Scottish government has shared the long-term ambition of the UK government, but successive 
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Scottish administrations have sought to exceed UK targets. The 2009 Climate Change (Scotland) Act, 
passed unanimously by the Scottish Parliament, is more ambitious than the 2008 UK Act, with harder 
targets and broader reach. It imposed a statutory obligation on the Scottish government to reduce all 
greenhouse gas emissions, including emissions from aviation, by 42% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 (on a 
1990 baseline), with annual targets towards these goals.4 It provided a legislative framework to 
regulate the activities of government, the private sector and individuals and covered a vast array of 
devolved policies, including forestry, land use, the promotion of energy efficiency, waste reduction and 
recycling, as well as provisions for adapting to climate change. The 2009 Act has been widely 
recognised as one of the most ambitious emissions reduction targets in the world, and frequently 
promoted as such in ministerial speeches.  
 
The promotion of renewable energy has been a key component of the Scottish government’s climate 
change programme, especially since the election of the SNP. In 2008, the SNP government set a target 
of generating 50% of Scottish demand for electricity from renewable sources by 2020. By 2011, the 
2020 target had increased to sourcing the equivalent of 100% of Scotland’s electricity consumption 
from renewables, thought to equate to around 14 GW of installed capacity, compared to actual installed 
capacity of 4.6 GW in 2011, and supported by a commitment to reduce energy demand (Scottish 
Government 2011a). The Scottish government aims to source 30% of all energy demand from 
renewables by 2020, a level of ambition on a par with Denmark (30%) and Portugal (31%), but notably 
higher than most other EU member states, and higher than the overall UK target (set by the EU) of 15% 
of all energy from renewables by 2020 (McEwen and Bomberg 2014). Although small in relation to the 
overall target, the Scottish government has taken a lead in the UK in setting a specific 2020 target of 
generating 500MW of electricity from community or locally-owned generating stations. It also has a 
specific and ambitious (given that in 2010 the figure stood at 2.8%) target to source 11% of heat 
demand from renewables by 2020. The Scottish government placed renewables targets at the heart of 
its economic development strategy, and regarded the low carbon revolution as a means by which 
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Scotland could gainrecognition internationally as the ‘green powerhouse for the continent of Europe’ 
(Salmond 2012). 
 
These policy outputs point towards a high level of ambition, but it is not altogether clear that variation 
in constitutional competence provides an explanation. The scale of ambition and leadership is at least 
as evident in the renewable energy programme as in the broader emissions reduction programme, in 
spite of the Scottish government’s lack of constitutional capacity in energy policy. The lack of 
constitutional autonomy has nonetheless created some obstacles toward the realization of these goals, 
as discussed below. 
 
Climate Ambition in Wales 
The Welsh government has also established challenging emission reduction targets and explicitly 
presented climate change as the world’s greatest environmental, economic and social global challenge 
(WAG 2010b). In 2007, the ‘One Wales’ Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition established a non-binding 
target to reduce carbon-equivalent emissions by 3% per year in areas of devolved competence from 
2011, the first government in the UK to set annual reduction targets (WAG 2007, p. 31). The 3% target 
included all ‘direct’ greenhouse gas emissions in Wales, except those from heavy industry and power 
generation covered by the EU ETS. The longer-term target was to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions 
in Wales by 40% by 2020 (on a 1990 baseline) (WAG 2010a). To this end, a Climate Change Strategy 
was developed with separate emissions reduction and adaptation delivery plans. Integral to Wales’ 
strategy is that EU and UK-level action directly contribute to realising the 3% target and the strategy 
anticipated that 40% of actions would be met by measures at these higher levels.  
 
Like its Scottish counterpart, the Welsh government has expressed ambitions for Wales as a 'global 
centre for energy' (WG 2012, p. 5). In 2005, it committed to a ‘4 TWh per annum renewable electricity 
production target by 2010 and a 7 TWh target by 2020’ - roughly equivalent to 2.7GW of installed 
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capacity (authors’ calculation, WAG 2010c, p. 10). The 2010 Energy Policy Statement estimated 
Wales’ potential to achieve a massive 22.5 GW of installed capacity by 2025, expressed as 43 kilowatt 
hours per day per person. This included 8.5 GW of tidal range capacity (half of which would be shared 
with England), 4 GW of tidal stream/wave power and 6 GW of offshore wind (one-fifth of which 
would be shared with England) (WAG 2010b). The policy statement explicitly acknowledged the need 
to work with others, especially the UK government, to realise this potential. For its part, the Welsh 
Assembly government set aims rather than targets, which varied in their specificity. For example, in 
tidal range, the policy aim was expressed vaguely - ‘to test the appropriateness and cost effectiveness of 
steps to exploit the tidal range of the Severn estuary’ - whereas in tidal stream/wave it is ‘to capture at 
least 10% (8 kWh/d/p) of the potential… energy off the Welsh coastline by 2025’ (ibid, p. 14). By 
2050, the ambition was to ensure that almost all of Wales’ local energy needs could be met by low 
carbon electricity production. The ambition was clear, even if the route to achieving it was less clear: 
‘Wales once led the world in carbon-based energy. Our goal now is to do the same for low carbon 
energy’ (WAG 2010b, p. 4). 
 
The Scottish and Welsh governments have clearly set themselves up to be more than simply 
implementers of central government policies. Their policy outputs and targets reflect their aims to be 
pioneers of climate policy, and neither appears to be hampered in their ambition by a lack of 
constitutional capacity. As expected, given the differences in their respective constitutional powers, the 
scale of ambition is greater in Scotland than in Wales. This is evident in the statutory underpinning of 
many of the Scottish outputs, the specification of targets and performance indicators, their associated 
financial investments, and the long-term targets and detailed route maps to achieving them. However, 
as in Scotland, the ambition in Wales is most evident with respect to renewable energy, despite the 
limited autonomy of devolved institutions in Wales beyond small-scale initiatives. Indeed, Welsh 
aspirations to harness natural resources to produce renewable energy are even higher than those 
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expressed by the Scottish government. Perhaps the real test of the relationship between ambition and 
power will be seen in policy implementation and the attainment of policy goals. 
 
 
Climate outcomes in Scotland and Wales 
Ambitious targets can be difficult to deliver, particularly for authorities with limited constitutional 
capacity. Yet, despite the contrasts between their high-level ambitions and capacity constraints, the 
evidence to date suggests that both Scotland and Wales have made at least partial progress towards 
realizing their goals. 
 
Scotland 
Greenhouse gas emissions in Scotland fell by 21.2% between 1990 and 2011, but there was recognition 
that securing the additional 21% reduction needed to meet the 2020 target would require new policies, 
not all of which fall within the current constitutional competence of the Scottish government (Scottish 
Government 2011b). In particular, because the Scottish target covered all emissions, not just those 
within devolved competence, it may be unachievable in the absence of an increased EU emissions 
reduction target from 20% to 30%; the EU traded sector, whose emissions are regulated by the EU 
emissions trading scheme, accounts for around 40% of all emissions in Scotland (CCC 2013c). Critics 
argue that more could be achieved domestically. Indeed, the government failed to meet its first two 
annual emissions reductions targets, set in accordance with the Climate Change Act. However, the UK 
Committee on Climate Change put the failure of the first target down to the exceptionally cold winter, 
and confirmed the overall trend towards emissions reductions, praising government initiatives to 
eliminate waste, reduce energy demand and tackle fuel poverty through investment in home insulation, 
and the acceleration of renewable power and heat (CCC 2013c). 
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There is little doubt that Scotland has become a front-runner in renewable energy, hosting 38% of the 
UK’s installed renewable electricity generation capacity in 2012, including almost 90% of UK hydro 
capacity and 44% of onshore wind (DECC 2013; Scottish Government 2014). Between 2003 and 2011, 
renewable capacity in Scotland increased by 187%, and generation from renewables by 269%. By 
2012, renewables contributed just under 30% of total electricity generation, which equated to 40% of 
domestic electricity consumption (Scottish Government 2014). Progress in renewable heat seems more 
modest, estimated at 2.6% of demand by 2012. These trends were supported by a range of government-
led initiatives and investments, over and above those implemented by the UK government, to support 
innovation, technological development, micro- and community-scale generation, and improve 
infrastructure for offshore development, alongside a political and planning framework conducive to 
renewables. But there remains some way to go before the 2020 100% consumption target for renewable 
electricity and the 11% consumption target for renewable heat is reached. 
 
Wales 
To date, Wales has made good progress in hitting its headline emissions reduction targets. The 3% 
target was exceeded in 2011 with a 10% emissions reduction, and the 2012 target was also likely to be 
met (WG 2013, p. 14). However, considering the impact of the economic downturn and milder winter 
weather, the Climate Change Commission for Wales, the Welsh Government’s independent advisory 
body, called for a ‘step change’ by diverting more attention and resources towards delivery (WG 2013, 
p. 49). The UK Committee on Climate Change continued to recommend a statutory basis for Wales’ 
climate change targets to strengthen the incentives for emissions reduction (CCC 2013b).  
 
Progress in realising renewable energy ambitions has been more limited. Between 2003-2011, 
renewable capacity increased by 116%, but at 929MW it represents just 6% of total UK renewable 
capacity (DECC 2013; CCC 2013a). Although in line with Wales’ share of UK consumption, this is 
less than either the ambition or the landscape potential would suggest. Moreover, the rate of renewables 
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growth in Wales has been slower than elsewhere in the UK. This may in part be a consequence of 
lower approval rates for planning applications, especially for smaller scale renewables, which fell in 
Wales from 65% in 2011 to just 8% in 2012 (compared to 51% and 48% in Scotland in 2011 and 2012 
respectively, and 51% and 44% in England; CCC 2013b, p. 90).  
 
Policy outcomes, then, provide mixed support for our hypotheses. The power disparities between 
Scotland and Wales are associated with disparities in performance between the two nations – Scotland, 
which enjoys greater constitutional capacity than Wales, performs better. Within each case, the 
association between constitutional capacity and policy outcomes is less clear. As anticipated, Wales 
performs moderately better in realizing emission reduction targets, where the devolved institutions have  
a little more constitutional competence, than in energy where devolved powers are minimal. By 
contrast, while Scotland demonstrates more progress in both spheres, this has been most evident in its 
renewable energy outcomes, despite the restrictions on its constitutional capacity to act on energy 
policy.  
 
Discussion  
We began by hypothesizing that greater constitutional capacity will shape the level of climate ambition, 
measured in both policy goals and policy outcomes. We anticipated this to be apparent when 
contrasting Scotland and Wales, with the former’s power advantages being evident in higher climate 
ambitions in policy goals, and higher achievements in policy outcomes. We also hypothesized that, in 
each case, variations in the degree of competence across policy fields would result in both outputs and 
outcomes being more ambitious in emissions reduction than in energy. 
 
Our findings are summarized in Table 2, and only partially support the hypotheses. 
 
Table 2: Evidence-based climate ambition in Scotland and Wales 
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 Emissions 
reductions 
Energy 
Policy outputs 
Scotland ++ ++ 
Wales + ++ 
Policy outcomes 
Scotland + ++ 
Wales + -- 
+/- signs symbolise identified levels of output and outcome  
 
Scotland’s greater scope for discretionary decision-making has helped it to innovate, incentivize and 
further its distinctive agenda. The reserved powers model of devolution gave the Scottish Parliament an 
opportunity to develop its own climate legislation (since climate change was not specifically reserved 
in the Scotland Act), and Scottish governments have used executive powers over electricity to promote 
and incentivize a renewables agenda, for example, by changing the Scottish Renewables Obligation to 
give additional support to marine renewables, and streamlining the planning process to facilitate project 
development.  
 
The Welsh government, by contrast, has been more dependent upon the UK government and 
parliament and thus had to give greater recognition to the multi-level and overlapping competences that 
have restricted its scope for taking its own distinctive action. In energy, in particular, Wales has been 
constrained, or ‘disadvantaged’ in the Welsh government’s view (WG 2012, p. 5), by its limited 
competences, leading to growing demands to strengthen energy consenting powers, including 
responsibility for energy consents up to 100MW on land and sea (WG 2011). These demands have thus 
far been rejected by the UK government. The Welsh case underlines the difficulty in establishing 
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credible policy outputs and outcomes in climate-related policy areas where there is a lack of clarity 
regarding constitutional powers and few opportunities to use legislative levers as policy instruments. 
 
Thus, there is a relationship between constitutional autonomy and climate ambition, but it is less than 
perfect, suggesting other factors also intervene to shape goals and outcomes. The research has led us to 
identify two additional variables: the strength of civil society; and the importance of territorial 
distinctiveness.  
 
The first echoes the emphasis placed on policy networks in advocating climate action in US states.  For 
example, Rabe highlighted the importance of policy networks when explaining the central role played 
by some American states in setting climate policy. State capitals were receptive to forming policy 
networks within which advocacy groups worked alongside policy entrepreneurs and legislators to 
advocate climate policy strategies and initiatives attuned to particular states (Rabe 2008, p. 107).  
Scotland has long enjoyed a distinctive civil society, and this has strengthened since devolution. Policy-
making and policy implementation involve extensive interaction with civil society actors, including 
from business and the third sector. In the climate arena, a cohesive and effective coalition of NGOs, 
church, labour and student unions (Stop Climate Chaos Scotland) lobbied political parties intensively, 
encouraging them toward the ambitious emissions reduction targets in the 2009 Act. A more elite 
Scottish Climate Change Business Delivery Group also put pressure on government to encourage 
ambition. In the wake of the legislation, its key figures established the 2020 Climate Group as a 
coalition of industry leaders, academics, trade union leaders, local authority chief executives and NGO 
leaders, to assist the Scottish Government in identifying and facilitating the changes in the public and 
commercial sectors necessary to realise Scotland’s climate ambitions (interviews; McEwen and 
Bomberg 2014). The government is supported by an Energy Advisory Board, co-chaired by the First 
Minister, and involving officials from central and local government, business leaders, the scientific 
community, consumer organisations and trade unions. This, and its subsidiaries, both shape policy and 
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help to pave the way for its implementation (interviews, ibid.). Civil society in Wales is weaker and its 
role in facilitating climate action is less developed. Building on the broad coalition of organisations 
(Stop Climate Chaos Cymru), which lobbied for ambitious climate targets, the Climate Change 
Commission for Wales, set up in 2007, has acted to generate broader consensus around climate action 
and as a critical voice for government (interviews). Nevertheless, Wales started from a different basis 
to Scotland due to limited institutional capacity and relative lack of policy expertise within and beyond 
government. This is most clear in relation to renewable energy, where the renewables sector is smaller 
and less able to lend support, and in community energy in particular, where capacity building efforts 
are in their infancy.  
 
The second variable underlines the importance of a territorial dimension to politics in sub-state nations 
like Scotland and Wales. This is evident in the distinctive national identity of ‘the people’, the 
distinctiveness of Scottish and Welsh political institutions, and nature of political competition, which in 
addition to left-right politics also features vibrant debates about the place and future of these nations 
within the UK, and their autonomy and influence vis-à-vis the UK government and parliament. This 
territorial dimension can frame debates over environmentalism and sustainability, for example, when 
discussing the nation’s natural resources, the exploitation of the land or the inter-generational 
implications of climate change for our children and our people. The nationalist parties in Scotland and 
Wales have at times fused nationalist with environmental discourse, as in 1992 when an MP was 
elected with joint Plaid Cymru - Green Party endorsement, coinciding with a stronger focus on 
ecological and environmental concerns in Plaid Cymru’s autonomy goals (Jones and Fowler 2008, see 
also Hamilton 2002).  
 
Territorial distinctiveness and the politics of territorial identity can thus interact with the degree of 
constitutional autonomy  especially in shaping the level of ambition in policy goals. Both Scotland and 
Wales are motivated at least in part by a desire to present their leadership in climate policy nationally 
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and internationally. In emissions reductions, for example, the Scottish government relished the 
opportunity to appear ‘a step ahead’ of the UK government (interview with special adviser), to 
demonstrate ‘the leadership we want to provide to the rest of the world’ (Scottish Government 2008, p. 
11) and to be praised by leading global figures from Al Gore to Ban Ki-moon and Mary Robinson. 
Although the Welsh government had up until 2015 chosen not to introduce its own climate legislation, 
Welsh targets were presented as comparable with ‘more ambitious plans for emission reduction 
globally’ (WAG 2010a, p. 4) and as more challenging than the UK commitments (WG 2012, p. 17).1 
Wales’ prominent and active role in international climate action networks (nrg4SD and Climate Group) 
have provided international visibility and a platform for its climate change credentials (interviews, 
Royles 2012).  
 
The territorial dimension links closely with the perceived limitations of constitutional capacity. In 
energy, in particular, the Scottish government has complained that its lack of constitutional competence 
over the regulatory framework in electricity acts as a barrier to achieving policy goals (McEwen 2013). 
For example, it had only a lobbying role to try to change what it regarded as an unfair transmission 
charging regime, which has imposed higher charges for grid connection in remote rural areas, and it 
had a consultative role only in relation to electricity market reform. The Welsh government has argued 
that complexity and overlapping competences in the planning system have exacerbated difficulties 
around planning and renewable energy, complaining that ‘it is anomalous that consents for large power 
stations are executively devolved to Scotland and not to Wales’ (WAG 2010b, p. 11). This position was 
partly acknowledged by the Commission on Devolution to Wales (2014), which recommended 
devolving all consenting responsibility below 350 MW to enable better development of Welsh energy 
resources, whilst retaining control of strategically important developments at the UK level. It also 
recommended parity for Wales with other devolved administrations in the forthcoming ‘contracts for 
difference’ system. 
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These debates, and climate ambition more broadly, should be understood in relation to the broader 
constitutional debates that are a dominant feature of politics in Scotland and Wales. For Scotland, the 
desire to maximize energy self-government is an end in itself, to enhance the capacity to shape ‘the 
totality of policy’, engage directly with the EU as a member-state, and gain credence among key 
players in the industry and internationally (interview with former minister). Being ambitious in 
establishing the incentives, infrastructure and drive to promote its bold renewables programme was at 
least in part intended to fuel the demand for Scottish self-government, and to ease concerns about its 
economic consequences after North Sea oil resources are exhausted. In Wales, calls for further energy 
powers have formed part of the Welsh Labour government’s pursuit of new constitutional 
arrangements with strengthened accountability and more effective devolved government. Vocal 
demands for further energy powers also reflected First Minister Carwyn Jones’ (politically strategic) 
willingness to publicly highlight disagreements with the UK government. This has been especially the 
case in the post-2010 context of total incongruence in the political composition of devolved and 
central governments, as well as the increased scope for conflict between both levels of government as 
a result of the post-2011 Welsh governance arrangements (the Government of Wales Act 2006 Part 
IV). Energy policy is one of the fields where both Scottish and Welsh governments have requested 
further constitutional powers. Whilst the case each makes has a clear rationale on grounds of climate 
action and economic development, demands for further powers are intertwined with broader claims to 
greater control over the political and economic future of the nations they represent, and are thus best 
understood as a feature of the territorial politics in which the UK state is embroiled. 
 
Conclusion 
Is constitutional capacity a key factor explaining variation in climate ambition among sub-state 
governments? Our analysis suggests a partial yes. We have demonstrated a relationship between the 
constitutional capacity to act and the scale of policy ambition. As hypothesized, the scale of ambition 
was more evident in Scotland than in Wales, and the Scottish government’s capacity to match ambition 
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with delivery was also apparent in most areas, at least in part because it enjoys greater legislative and 
executive powers in those fields which are key to climate policy. However, the overall relationship 
between our independent and dependent variables is more complex. In spite of its almost complete lack 
of competence in energy, Welsh ambition is evident with respect to long-term goals, although the lack 
of constitutional capacity to deliver on these goals is starkly evident. By contrast, one of the staggering 
features of the Scottish government in recent years is its achievements in developing and delivering the 
most successful and ambitious renewable energy programme in the UK, despite energy being a 
reserved matter under the devolution settlement.  
 
Growing attention to sub-state government climate action is critical to understanding the multi-level 
policy responses to climate change globally. Sub-state governments have become increasingly visible 
and articulate in their climate action credentials in parallel to growing global recognition of their role. 
However, critical questions surround the potential gap between rhetoric and action. A focus on the 
constitutional power of sub-state regional authorities can help to explain why. The framework 
developed here could be used to examine climate action within and between other sub-state polities – 
indeed, an examination of constitutional capacity and how it interacts with other region-specific 
variables may also help to explain variation among sub-state governments in policy ambition and 
progress across other environmental policies. Not all sub-state governments are the same. Their 
constitutional powers and capacities for action vary considerably. Our evidence suggests that case and 
comparative studies of sub-state climate action would be enhanced by consideration of constitutional 
capacity as an explanatory variable underpinning climate action. Of course, it cannot be considered in 
isolation. As our analyses revealed, other factors can empower or disempower sub-state governments in 
pursuit of policy goals. In our cases, the strength of civil society enhanced capacity for action in 
Scotland, while in Wales its weakness made effective action more difficult. The territorial dimension of 
politics that is a feature of Scottish and Welsh politics, as it is in other strong identity nations and 
regions, helped to explain why the governments have been motivated to assert their distinctiveness 
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through climate ambition even where they lack constitutional power. Being ambitious and progressive 
has helped to raise the profile of these historic nations internationally, and allowed them to appear more 
progressive than their principal ‘other’, the UK government. Examining the impact of constitutional 
power on sub-state climate action, and ways in which it interacts with other key variables, can thus 
inform our understanding of why some sub-state governments are more ready than others to play a 
meaningful and progressive role in response to the increasingly urgent global challenge of climate 
action. 
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Endnotes 
1. GVA per head in Scotland was 94% of UK average in 2012; Wales was 72%. Scotland’s 
labour productivity and median earnings were higher than in Wales, while unemployment was 
lower - 7.2% in Scotland in 2013 and 8.2% in Wales. (ONS, 2013a; ONS, 2013b).  
2. In 2011, the threshold for applications for hydroelectric generating stations was raised to in 
excess of 50MW, giving local planning authorities greater control over small scale hydro.  
3. We use the different official terminology to refer to the Welsh executive, utilising Welsh 
Assembly Government for the 2002-11 period, and Welsh Government for post-2011.   
4. The baseline is 1990 for CO2, but 1995 for some other greenhouse gases. The 42% target was reached 
in the final stage of the legislative process, following pressure from environmental groups and a 
game of political one-upmanship with the opposition Labour Party. 
5. . The Government committed to following Scotland and Northern Ireland’s suit by introducing 
statutory climate change targets in the Environment Bill to be brought forward during 2015. 
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